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EDITORIAL 
This issue of the MANAGEMENT QUARTERLY is a continuation of a pro-
ject started in the Spring of 1969 by our fellow students at the Naval 
Postgraduate School • · 
The articles selected for inclusion in this edition of the MANAGE-
MENT QUARTERLY have undergone a rigorous double-review process in order 
to qualify for selection for publication. First, candidate articles 0 
represent those student academic efforts which the various members of 
the faculty from every education and research department of the Naval 
Postgraduate School consider as having exceptional merit in terms of 
well documented research, soundness of conclusions, and excellence of 
preparation. Second, submissions are screened by the editorial staff of 
the MANAGEMENT QUARTERLY in order to select for publication those 
articles which, in our opinion, represent the best works in terms of 
readability, informative value, and broad-based appeal. 
The selections contained in this edition are diverse in their sub-
ject matter and represent a broad range of topics. This edition, there-
fore, was formulated from a rather large number of papers submitted by 
a concerned faculty. ~lith this in mind, we gratefully acknowledge the 
excellent literary efforts of the many students whose papers provided us 
with material from which the selections for publication were made. We 
al so wish to. thank the many faculty members, without whose contributions 
our task would have been impossible. We are particularly grateful to 
our advisor, Lieutenant Commander Ken Patterson, United States Navy, 
for his guidance and help in our task. 
The views expressed in the MANAGEMENT QUARTERLY are those of the 
authors exclusively, and in no way reflect the attitude or endorsement 
of the Department of Defense, Navy Department, or the Naval Postgraduate 
School. 
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LCDR . Allison and LT R. N. Seebeck 
When threatened with change, many individuals and groups quickly lean 
toward reorganization - using a helter skelter approach to the problem. 
However, in the defense of deliberate and well reasoned change, this paper 
discusses many favorable dimensions .of change and their beneficial effects 
upon the informal and formal components of an organization. 
This article was submitted to Professor J. W. Creighton in partial ful-
fillment of course objectives for technology transfer (MN 3801). 
The Editors 
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Consider this comroon situation : the middle level manager is tasked 
to implement a managerial change in an organization. What are going to 
be his first thoughts about this forthcoming act ion? Questions will arise 
in the manager's mind that concern the effect that this change, now and 
later, successful or unsuccessful, will have upon his job situation. \~ill 
it require more of his already overtaxed work-day? Could this change 
cause him to lose his job? Will he be judged on new job performance 0 
criteria? Will this mean greater pay, prestige or other privileges? 
All of these questions, in a greater or lesser fashion, deal with the 
primary question of identification with the change. An endless variety 
of experiential, envi ronmental and behavioral variables go into determining 
how receptive he wiJl be to a change. He may strongly identify in a positive 
manner and enthusiastically endorse the change; he may be indifferent; or 
he may unequivocably oppose it. His position with regard to the change is 
itself subject to variation through time as the factors which went into 
his decision themselves are altered. Given this highly unpredictable state 
of events, the discussion to follow will establish factors that the manager 
should fonnally and consciously take into account when laying out his plans. 
CHANGE CONSIDERATIONS 
There may be many reasons, why the change is, or ·is not, necessary. 
These reasons could take the form of strictly economic objectives or purely 
political considerations. Although a manager has been given the respon-
sibility for a change program, this does not preclude the possibility t hat 
the change may not be necessary. If, in his judgment, this change is an 
unnecessary one from an economic standpoint, he has a responsibility to 
point this fact out to his superiors. If this change was generated by 
the manager himself, then maintenance of objectivity in judging its 
necessity will be considerably more difficult .• 
The end result of the manager's analysis will likely point out the 
fact that devising a plan for a change which is both politically and 
economically necessary will be much less difficult than in the opposite 
case where only one facet creates necessi ty. It is hoped that where a 
change ts neither politically nor economical ly necessary, an effort would 
be made to abort the change process. The manager shoul d then attempt to 
fix clearly in his mind the result he is trying to achieve through the 
change process. It is a very difficult task to try to travel a road i n 
the right direction if you have not clea rly· defined the objective you 
want to attain. 
In this step of the aAalysis phase the responsible manager should 
gather as much data as possible about t he proposed change. This phase 





overlay all other parameters. However, for our purposes consider this 
term as relating specifically to whether the manager has been given 
(or knows} particular constraints or limits within which he must manage. 
These constraints could take the fonn of resource constraints, time 
constraints or even management constraints. This concept brings. one around 
to the idea of flexibility. Has the manager been allowed a great deal of 
leeway in dealing with this problem? 
Another question which should be dealt with here is whether this is 
a singular or multiple change. Does the manager have to make a nurrber of 
small changes in different areas or just one large change in a particular 
area? The answer might well be a combination that varies in any direction 
along these two lines. An experienced manager will naturally have reached 
some conclusion as to the magnitude of the problem with which he is faced. 
Any change process can vary considerably in terms of size and the important 
point to consider in this respect is the expectation of magnitude in the 
future. The first question to be answered considers the scope of the change 
when initiated. The second and perhaps more important question deals with 
his prediction of variation through time. That is, will the implementation 
of this process today bring about additional and roore far-reaching changes 
torrorrow? 
The manager must consider the all-important variable of time. There 
are a great many aspects with regard to this variable that may come into 
play. The first of these is simply the tinE constraint itself. Has a 
deadline been dictated or implied within which the manager must operate? 
If the time allowed is so constrained, this variable might well eliminate 
any possibility for even a subjective analysis of the problem such as is 
being suggested here. At the other extreme, the time constraints, when 
considered in conjunction with other variables, may necessitate a detailed 
analysis both more explicit and quantitative. 
Second, one needs to consider the timeliness of change. There is 
never a perfectlb convenient time to introduce change; however, there is 
often some flexi ility as to the timing of when a change action is pub-
licized within an organization. The objective of the manager should be 
to choose a time that minimizes disruption. 
A third perspective with which to view the time variable is concerned 
with the planned duration of the impending change. Is the intent of this 
action to provide a temporary stopgap solution to a problem; or is it in-
tended to be a long term, final answer? The procedure for planning one 
versus the other of these changes would indicate that the former might 
not receive as much attention as the latter. 
A fourth and final time variable deals with the anticipated rate of 
change through tiJJE. This concept draws heavily upon the time constraint 
discussed earlier and yet may theoretically vary inversely with that constraint. 
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Consider two changes, both of which must be implemented within a one 
month period. The first of these, due to certain of its characteristics, 
can be introduced little by little in a rmre or less evolutionary process . 
The second of these, again because of its characteristics, dictates complete 
introduction on -day one, a totally revolutionary process forced upon the 
manager. The point to be made here is that the anticipated time rate of 
change will have an important effect on the manager's ability to plan his 
change program. 
The origin of the change has been alluded to previously but will now O 
be dealt with separately. The question to be answered here concerns 
itself with the persons/positions who were responsible for bringing about 
the decision to change. The origins of a change decision may wel l have 
an important effect upon the plans which a manager must make to implement 
that decision. Its origin could well lie in or out of the organization, 
but the objective of the middle-level manager should include the identifi-
cation of the organization sponsors for this program. Knowing this, he 
should consider pertinent data about these sponsors in the formulation of 
his plan. 
As a final set of variables concerned with characteristics of the 
change itself, the manager should account for the physical location in 
which the change is to take place. A change which is to be implemented 
in the office next door to the company president presents a different 
situation than one to be made in a branch office some 3,000 miles away. 
The question to be answered involves a judgment with regard to the visi-
bility that this change will be endowed with during its implementation. 
It may well be necessary to make allowances for this in devising the imple-
mentation plans. 
THE ORGANIZATION 
In planning for change, both formal and informal aspects of the 
organization should be evaluated, categorized by situational variable and 
individually analyzed. The paragraphs to follow will define several 
variables within each aspect of the organization. Additionally, examples 
will be presented to dermnstrate how some of these variables may fluctuate 
in different situations. 0 
The first variable to be considered with regard to the formal organi-
zation is its mission. This variable encompasses past, present and future 
objectives of the organization. J.bst organizations have a formal mission 
statement. As an example, the mission of the Naval Postgraduate School 
is as fo 11 ows : 
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"To conduct and direct the advanced educatfon of com-
missioned officers, and to provide such other technical and 
professional instruction as may be prescribed to meet the 
needs of the Naval service; and in support of the foregoing, 
to foster and encourage a program of research in order to 
sustain academic excellence. 111 
Each level in the hierarchy of the organization also has its own formal 
mission statement which generally supports the overall mission objective 
O of the organization. 
In planning for change, the responsible manager should attempt to 
, evaluate the change process in terms of its possible effects upon the 
various fonnal objectives of the organization and its subunits. If, 
0 
in the judgment of the analyst, this change will have an effect upon formal 
objectives then even a minor change in the fonnal mission statement would 
likely create a ripple effect as it progressed down through the subunits 
of the organization. Therefore, when accounting for mission changes, the 
manager may be faced with the necessity of revising the unit's goals and 
developing a working nridel that accounts for the change and its effects. 
The second variable with regard to the fonnal organization deals with 
its structure. This variable is concerned with the actual scale of the 
organization. Dichotomies to be considered include whether the organiza-
tion is large or small, matrix or hierarchical, production or service-
oriented. Th.e manager involved with different ends of these scales must 
consjder whether to implement changes by means of an approach which accounts 
for these differences. 
An analysis of the organization structure leads into the third variable 
within the formal organization, consnunications, which is highly affected 
by the structure of the organization. The formal conmunications network 
of an organization is the official channel through which information flows 
both vertically and horizontally. The manager should be thoroughly 
familiar with and understand these formal communications procedures. 
In implementing change, the manager must take precautions in order 
not to conmunicate a change through this network at the wrong time or 
to the wrong individuals. Many conflicts in organizations have developed 
due to infonnation on changes entering the fonnal conmunications channel 
at the wrong time or place. 
Again it must be emphasized that the manager understand how the formal 
communication channel operates and who is connected to it. Of course, 
the larger the organization becomes, the harder it is for the manager to 
control the information flow in the channel. 
1Naval Postgraduate School Catalogue 1977-1978, p.1. 
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The fourth variable concerns the vitality of the organization, that 
is, the organization's vigor. Is it dynamic or static, in a growth 
situation or a decline? 
The manager whose job is to plan for the implementation of change, 
should account for this stability, or lack thereof, within the context of 
the fonnal organization. Admittedly, one might expect that the introduction 
of change in an extremely vigorous organization would be considerably less 
difficult than in the opposite case. This logic fails, however, when one 
attempts to generalize this relationship to all situations. If the change 0 
process is to be successful, the manager must consider the organizational 
resistance to the particular change process about to be introduced . 
Organizational resistance to the change process, which amounts to 
the sum of individual resistances, is highly correlated with the vitality 
of the organization, as well as characteristics of the change itself 
and other forces at work in the infonnal organization. 
Within the context of the formal organization, the fifth vari abl e 
concerns itself with externalities, which are the external constra i nts 
that affect the organization. Examples include labor-management contracts, 
legal constraints and ethical or imral considerations. These constraints, 
whether originating from outside or inside the organization, should be 
evaluated by the manager. 
In evaluating these factors the manager should try to identify 
possible conflict areas both at thetlme of initiation and further as the 
change program proceeds through time. The situation and the characteristics 
of the change itself may, in fact, mesh in such a way as to cause these 
external influences to have positive vice negative effects upon the change 
process. The identification and evaluation of these variables is a 
necessary and integral part of any analysis intended to aid in planning 
for change. 
The sixth variable stenming from the formal organization deals with 
resource limitations such as ironey, people and facilities. Given that 
a manager must implement a change, does he have the proper mix of men, 
ironey and material to implement that change successfully? The situation 
may require the manager to initiate a program to train personnel in new 
skills required to implement the change or gather other additional resources. 0 
The last variable in the formal organizat ion that must be analyzed 
by· the manager is time. Time, in this context, is concerned with the 
history of the organization. This history is made up of the attitudes, 
stability, traditions and experience of the organization through time. 
In other words, is the organization new or old, a dynamic or static entity? 
What experience has the organization had with change in the past? All of 
these factors must be analyzed by the manager and taken into account when 
planning for change. 
6 
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THE INFORMAL ORGANIZATION 
Having examined several variables pertaining to the formal organization 
as it is perceived by the manager responsible for a change program, 
attention should be directed toward analyzing situational variables within 
the context of the informal organization. 
The informal goals of an organization are the objectives held by 
individuals and groups which make up the organization. These ~oals may 
or ma not coincide with the formal or anization's oals. It 1s this 
fact w ,c ma es ,t important for e manager to account for the goals 
within the infernal organization. The desired result of this analysis 
is to decrease conflict between these goalss whenever possible, by planning 
for implementation of change. 
The informal structure of an organization, made up of informal 
leaders and groups, is often quite different from its fonnal design. In 
planning for change, the manager must identify the informal leaders and 
groups within the organization and, at the same time, ascertain their 
attitudes toward the organization and the change itself. These attitudes 
will be pararoount in the acceptance or rejection of the manager's plan 
for change. 
The informal conmunications network within an organization is conmonly 
known as the "grapevine. 11 This conmunications network is sometimes faster 
and often under 1 ess control by management han the formal information 
channels. In order to increase the success of his plan for change, the 
manager must be aware of this informal communications channel and understand 
how it functions. 
The manager must a 1 so be ab 1 e to i den ti fy the "ga tel<eepers II in the 
infonnal network. Gatekeepers are people within the informal organization 
that control the flow of information both through the organization and 
into the organization. Gatekeepers can also be described as change agents 
in that they help to implement a change or reject it by conveying their 
attitudes concerning the change through the informal conmunications network. 
In planning for change, the manager should seek out the organizational 
gatekeepers and use them to successfully plan for the change with a minimum 
O anx,unt of conflict. 
Externalities are those factors present in the informal organization 
which have their roots totally outside the organization itself. Prevalent 
society norms, comnunity standards and influence or opinion leaders who 
are not a part of the formal organization are examples of what may be 
termed externalities. Dependent upon characteristics of the particular 
change in question, such factors as externalities may have either a positive 
or negative effect upon any eventual outcome. What the manager is attempting 
to do is simply identify whether factors such as these might come into play 
when the program is initiated or as it proceeds. 
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It has not been the contention of this paper that the proposed 
process be a panacea for managing change. On the contrary, the desired 
result of this effort is that the manager faced with a change program 
find it marginally less difficult to identify those variables which may 
act to influence the success or failure of an impending change. 
What was begun as a simple exercise in enumeration of influences 
upon the change process, has become a considerable effort in attempting 
to RDdel one small portion of that system. It became necessary to further 
restrict the analysis to one particular perspective, the middle level 
manager, in order to present the ideas discussed in any sort of a reasonable 
form. There is much, however, that needs to be evaluated, categorized 
and presented to further understand the process of change. 
It is strongly recomnerided that further study be devoted both to 
statistical proof of the ideas suggested in this study and to other 







Allen, T. J. 110rganizational Aspects of Information Flow in 
Technology, 11 ASLIB Proceedings. November 20~ 1968. 
Naval Postgraduate School Catalogue 1977-1978. U.S. Government 
Printing Office: 790/517-1977. 
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MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES 
by 
Wil l iam H. Westhoff 
There are a variety of effective management methods which have appl i-
cation in military organizatio ns. LTC Westhof , while looking at the 
Fleet Marine Force, discusses three factors affecting management 
methods: time; contribution; and priorities . He then discusses the 
use of management by objective (MBO) to improve an organization•s 
effectiveness. The impact of these factors and attain ment of an effective 
MBO program in an organizatio n are t hen examined from a management viewpoint. 
This paper was submitted to Professor J . W. Creighton in partial fulfill-
ment of the course requirements for MN 4147. 
The Edi tors 
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Command interest turned out to be an important aspect of equipment 
readiness in the Fleet Marine Forces. The co11111ander of each fleet 
organization is responsible for the creation of an environment that allows 
the unit to successfully complete it's mission. At each level of schools 
in military operations, commanders and their staffs are provided with the 
basic functions of a manager. However, these functions of planning, 
organizing, directing, controlling and conmunicating do not provide a 
model that describes how to manage the organization's environment so 
that equipment readiness is enhanced. 
PROBLEM 
What management method could be used by commanders to manage the 
business-oriented equipment readiness operations of their units? 
EFFECTIVENESS 
Dr. Peter Drucker has identified three key factors in being an 
effective manager: time, contribution and priorities~ 
A. Time 
The conmander, as a limited resource, must know how he is currently 
being expended or where his time actually goes. Mentally recalling the 
amount of time spent on various activities each day and over several weeks 
is not an adequate measure of a commander's time. He must record actual 
time-use. The method used can be varied but the result must reflect the 
activity, the actual time and not be based on merrory. The record of time 
used can be analyzed after it has been accurately recorded. 
The analysis of time-use can be done in three areas . First, identify 
and eliminate those things that do not need to be done at all. Second, 
identify and delegate those things that could be done as well by somebody 
else. Finally, identify and eliminate the activities of the commander 
O that waste the time of subordinates. Characteristics of activities in 
these areas include recurrent crisis, overstaffing, an excess of meetings 
and poor information flow. 
I 
The final activity relating to time-use is consolidating the time a 
commander has freed for his use. This discretionary time is limited and 
must be applied to those areas where he can make the best contribution to 
1orucker, Peter F., The Effective Executive, p. 7. 
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his organization. The effective activities of a commander equire 
adequate time to plan, study and coordinate. The commander who can free 
up two-thirds of a day each week will gain nothing if it is spread out 
in 10 and 15 minute blocks throughout the week. The commander must con-
solidate his discretionary time to use it effectively. Meetings, office 
hours, briefings, inspections and the other activities of the commander 
should be scheduled to allow for the consolidation of discretionary 
time. 
B. Contribution 
Each commander must direct himself toward the value he can add to 
the organization. His comnitment or contribution must consider the entire 
organization and its purpose. The conmander's efforts must be result-
oriented rather than effort- or work-oriented. He must want to take and 
be held responsible for the performance of his whole unit, not just a 
special section or area. 
The conmander has three areas to contribute to with regard to the 
whole organization. These areas are direct results, the creating of 
values and the development of people. He must contribute in each of 
these areas to help the organization exist today, to grow and survive 
tomrrow. 
The direct results to be attained are usually well known; for example, 
to provide combat power, communications, fire support and service support. 
These areas have the characteristic of being essentials in the daily 
operation of the unit. The commander's first priority in contributing 
to the organization should be in the direct result area . The co111T1ander 
must contribute to the organization 1 s continuing values . Esprit and pride 
in performance and duties are typical areas . The commander must weigh 
the ambiguities in values in making his contribution to this area. For 
instance, he must balance physical training and military subjects training 
time, the performance of equipment preventive maintenance and the mission 
of the unit so that the value of each time demand is kept in proper per-
spective with the unit 1 s mission needs. 
Finally, the commander is required to contribute to the future of 
the organization through the development of its people. The co1t111ander 
must continuously enhance the ability of his people to mve beyond their 
present-day performance levels. The corrmander who emphasizes the importance 
of each man contributing to the organization is causing his people to 
adjust to a higher level of demand. Corrmunications are increased by people 
working to find ways to help contribute to the whole organization and not 
just to the smaller portion within which they work. This emphasis on 
contribution tends to increase lateral corrmunications and, therefore, 






c. Priori ti es 
The conmander must concentrate his efforts. Effectiveness is 
enhanced by concentrating on one thing at a time. Due to his limited 
discretionary time the commander must focus his time on his contributions 
to the organization. 
A conmander's contributions, by their important nature, require a 
substantial arrount of time. Additionally, because he has so many things 
to do, he must concentrate his effort, resources and time in order to get 
a large number of his many requirements done. Effectiveness in this 
environment lies in the commander concentrating his time and resources on 
doing one task at a time and insuring that he is working on that task 
which makes the highest contribution to the whole organization. 
The manager must assign priorities to tasks by considering several 
characteristics of his tasks. Tasks which relate to the future offer rrore 
opportunities than tasks that correct problems of the past and only return 
the organization to a previously established norm. The choice is between 
focusing on opportunities instead of on problems. The priority of the 
tasks should be based on the difference the tasks will make for the whole 
organization. The commander must continually reassess the priorities of 
his tasks after the one he has concentrated on is completed. 
MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES 
The question the conmander faces is how to bring about an improvement 
in effectiveness. He must find a method, vehicle or rrodel which allows 
him to gather together his mission, unit and people. Management by 
objectives (MBO) is a business sector-developed approach which could be 
used successfully by a conmander. 
MBO is a systematic approach to attaining goals. It's structure allows 
a conmander to apply the above effectiveness principles. MBO has been 
defined as having the following parts: 
11First, those accountable for directing the organization 
determine where they want to take the organization or what 
they want it to achieve during a particular period (estab-
lishing the overall objectives and priorities). 
Second, all key managerial, professional and administrative 
personnel are required, permitted and encouraged to con-
tribute their maximum efforts to achieving the overall 
objectives. 
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Third, the planned achievement (results) of all key personnel 
is blended and balanced to promote and realize the greater 
total results for the organization as a whole. 
Fourth, a control mechanism is established to nnnitor progress 
compared to objectives and feed the results back to those 
accountable at all levels. 112 
7 
The system components of MB0 are the establishment of objectives, directing 
the attainment of objectives and monitoring results. 0 
A. Objectives 
MB0 requires that objectives established by the conwnander give 
direction to the organization. These overall objectives become the 
framework within ·which the subordinate line and staff managers will 
develop their objectives. The participation of trultiple-level managers 
in setting supporting objectives is discussed ITl)re fully by John W. 
Humble in his book, How to Manage bl Objectives. These multiple-level 
objectives break down, in a control ed manner, the overall objectives into 
manageable parts. This is done by the agreement of the subordinate managers 
and their conmander on each subordinate's objectives. 
When added together, the objectives that are agreed upon equal the 
overall objectives of the conmander. To be effective each of the objectives 
must have t~e following characteristics: 
(1) Specific - The description must clearly state the who, what and 
when of the objective. 
(2) Attainable - The objectives must be within the authority and 
ability of the managers to accomplish them. The objectives 
should, however, require the managers to exert more than their 
nonnal effort to complete them. 
(3) Result-oriented - The objectives should be a specific statement 
of an end result, not a description of activities to be performed 
by the managers. 
(4) Limited to priorities - The number of objectives should be con- 0 
trolled to allow the managers to be able to handle them. Limiting 
the numbers of objectives reinforces the need to evaluate and 
agree on the use of priority objectives ~ 
2McConkey, Dale D., '430 for Nonprofit Organizations, pp. 37-38. 
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B. Directing Attainment 
Each manager's objectives must be converted to specific plans of how 
the objectives are to be accomplished. The plan for each objective spells 
out, step by step, how the manager intends to attain his objectives. The 
review and agreement by the co11111ander concerning the subordinate manager's 
plans assures that the plans are realistic, attainable in view of avatlable 
resources and in agreement with the co1T111ander1 s overall objectives. The 
plans lay out a concrete way to measure the movement of the unit toward 
o its goals. 
0 
After specific plans for each subordinate's objectives have been 
developed and approved by the comnander, the managers are required to give 
the necessary directions and to take the proper actions to carry out his 
objectives. Here the managers must perform the functions of coordinating, 
corrmunicating and motivating their people. Each manager must put into 
action the plans that he has established. It is through his directions 
that the objectives become reality. 
C. Results 
MBO establishes specific objectives and then defines the specific 
way they will be measured. Each goal has a measure tailored to it. The 
measure determines how well the goal is being attained. The controls 
developed for each objective are designed to inform only the manager and 
to provide.only the information necessary for his level. 
MBO gives the manager responsibility. After objectives and plans 
are agreed upon by the comnander and fiis managers, each manager is respon-
sible for the accomplishment of his objectives. The controls necessary 
to do this need to support the managers, not the next higher level. The 
result is an operational control system that is both shorter and more 
responsive than one that requires reports to superiors. Controls that 
flow through superiors decrease the responsibilities of the subordinates 
and cause the conmanders to expend their limited time in performing 
delegateable \t«Jrk. 
James Longley, Governor of Maine, discussing the relationship between 
leadership and delegation of responsibility said: 
11A leader must have strength and the capacity to deleaate and 
turn his back and walk away and depend on others to implement 
the decision. 
A leader must recognize that while every act or commission 
delegated might not be fulfilled completely to his satisfaction, 
that in all probability it might have been done better than he 
could do, or would have done himself, if for no other reason 
than he can't do everything. 
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A leader must strive for perfection but recognizes that if he 
waits to do anything, or complete a mission so expertly that 
no one, present or future can ever find fault with it, chances 
are he will never accomplish the mission. 113 
3Longley, James B., "Honorary Marine Proud of Title, 11 Marine Corps 
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TWENTY VS THIRTY YEAR 
RETIREMENT ALTERNATIVES: 
A STOCHASTIC APPROACH 
by 
D. L. Chadwick, T. B. Fox and T. C. Wi l l iams 
In an effort to reduce the defense budget, Congress is considering 
a variety of personnel and financial alternatives. Perhaps the most 
controversial is the modifying of the current retirement benefit plan 
available to the military. This paper addresses two proposed retirement 
alternatives; a 20 and 30 year retirement plan. The authors use a 
stochastic manpower flow model to predict officer populations based 
on the different retirement plans. 
This paper was submitted to Professor A. R. Washburn i n partial ful-
fillment of the course requirements for OA 4705. 
The Editors 
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The feasibility of a 30-year retirement system for the armed forces 
is currently a popular topic. Substantial savings in inflated DOD man-
power expenditures are anticipated with the implementation of any one 
of several proposed 30-year retirement policies. The primary objective 
of this study was the development of a stochastic manpower flow model which 
would be flexible enough to encompass both the current 20-year and the 
proposed 30-year retirement systems. Time constraints required our 
restricting attention to the U.S. Navy officer corps, although the 
methodology described could be expanded to encompass the entire armed 
forces. A secondary purpose of the study effort was the utilization of 
the flow rodel in providing insights into the magnitude of the cost 
differentials which would be realized by implementation of a 30-year 
retirement system. It must be emphasized that the principle cost factors 
investigated by this modelling effort are the expected annual government 
expenditures due to base pay received by active duty personnel and 
retirement payments to those eligible under each of the proposed retire-
ment alternatives. The annual expenditure attributable to PX/Commissary 
benefits and health care benefits have not been specifically addressed. 
The 20-year retirement plan rrodel is based on data from calendar 
year 1976. The 30-year rodel is developed by making several assumptions 
about actions such as promotion while maintaining the same number of 
officers of each rank specified by the 20-year model. The three 30-year 
retirement alternatives evaluated include: 
Alternative 1 - This alternative is based upon the plan recommended by 
the President's Co1T111ission. Eligibility for collection of retirement pay 
begins after ten years of service with an increasing percentage of base 
pay for service beyond the ten year point. In this alternative payments 
do not commence upon attrition from active duty, but at the collection 
age indicated in the table below. 
Yrs of Service % of Base Pay Co 11 ec t at Age 
1o 21 .25 62 
15 35.0 62 
20 48.75 60 
25 62.5 60 
30 76.25 55 
35 90.0 55 
Alternative 2 - This alternative provides a lump sum payment at separation 
dependent upon final base pay for those individuals completing ten to 
thirty years of active service. An annual stipend of 75% of final base 
pay for life is paid to those officers completing thirty or more years 
active service. 
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Alternative 3 - This alternative provides a lump sum payment illlllediately 
upon separation (similar to that in alternative 2) for those officers 
completing at least ten years of active service . For those individuals O 
with twenty or more years active duty, an annual retirement pay based 
upon final base pay is given but collection does not begin until thirty 
years from the commencement of service . Retirement pay increases from 
50% of base pay after 20 years of service to 75% of base pay for thirty 
years of service. 






1. Flow Model Description 







Lump Sum or Retirement 
Lump Sum 
Lump Sum 
Retirement in 10 years 
Retirement in 5 years 
Retirement now 
In mdeling the current Navy officer corps, this project team con-
sidered essentially two 2-dimensional approaches; the Grade-Time in Grade 
Model (G-TIG), and alternatively, the Grade-Length of Service Model (G-L0S). 
The primary advantage of the G-TIG Model is that it is easy to 11Ddel pro-
motion criteria, i.e., promtion zones, based upon TIG requirements, etc. 
The G-L0S Model lends itself to the modeling of retirement systems based 
on accumulated length of service and also the costing of active duty pays 
based on LOS. 
Consideration was given to a three-dimensional manpower mdel incor-
porating all three items, that is, each state would be uniquely identified 0 
by Grade, TIG and LOS. However, due to the large number of feasible 
combinations of these three parameters (approximately 1750 states), it was 
decided that the two-dimensional state description model would suffice. 
The three dimensional manpower flow model is a high resolution nodel which 
would be especially attractive if the study objective was an evaluation 
of the effects of instituting changes in promotion criteria. The steady 
state complexion of the active duty population as a result of the imple-




' imdel application. Since proposed 30-year retirement options and their 
effects on total system costs was to be the project's primary objective, 
the grade-LOS model was chosen. This choice necessitated a secondary 
1TDdeling effort in the formulation of relationships expressing prorootion/ 
non-prorrotion probabilities as explicit functions of the two state 
variables: the individual's grade and length of service. 
2. 20-Year Model 
The present 20-year system population data generated the following 











Ul - 18 YEARS 
Ul - 23 11 
Ul - 28 11 
Ul - 33 11 
6 - 34 II 
15 - 35 II 
26 - 35 II 
Active Duty Officers 



















+anon-compensated attrition state 
The non-compensated attrition state is a sink for all officers who attrit 
from active duty without qualifying for retirement benefits. 
In 1TDdeling the manpower system encompassed by these 235 possible 
(G-LOS) states, a repetitive Markov Chain was utilized. Due to the large 
number of possible states and in order to make the matrix computations 
roore efficient, the special structure of the military grade system was 
used to break the large system into eight smaller subsystems (one per 
grade). 
Grade i subsystem 
From a (Grade i; LOS L) state, the only possible transitions are to: 
1) (Grade i; LOS L + 1) 
2) (Grade i + 1; LOS L + 1) 
3) ("tttr·i ted out of Service; LOS L + 1 ) 
at grade i 
Thus for the subsystem corresponding to grade i; the states which the 




) Grade i - All feasible LOS categories 
) Grade i + l - All feasible LOS categories 
3} Attrition states corresponding to grade i - feasible LOS (after 
20) categories. 
Note: With regard to the single grade subsystem, all grade i states are 
considered transient states. The grade i +land attrition states 
are considered absorbing states. This categorization allows the 
following matrices and vectors to be generated from the data 
base: 0 
The matrix (I-Q); where Q is the transient (non-absorbing) portion 
of the Markov transition matr ix P. This is the inverse of the 
fundamental matrix N. 
The matrix R; where R is the transient state to absorbing state 
portion of the transition matrix P. 
The vector c.; where c. is a vector of the number of individuals 
in each LOS !ategory eitering this subsystem from sources external 
to the subsystem each period (year). This would include one year's 
accessions from the civilian population and enlisted ranks, and 
one year's prorootion flow from the previous grade. 
Having defined these matrices, from repetitive Markov theory the 
following properties are noted: 
(1} c1N1 is a vector of the long run (steady state} distribution in each LOS category for this garde. 
(2) C.NiR. is a vector of the expected periodic (yearly) flow to 
t~e aisorbing states, i.e., this would yield the yearly promotion 
·flow to the next grade and the yearly retirement/attrition flow 
out of service from this grade. 
The yearly promotion flow vector is the entity which ties all the 
subsystems together in the manpower model. The special structure of 
the matrix (I-Q) for each grade subsystem pennits the solution of equation 
(1) for the steady state distribution vector without actually performing 
the matrix inversion. 0 
is equivalent to: 
SSDISTi (I-Q) = Ci where N=(I-Q)-l 




3. 30-Year Modifications 
The feasible LOS categories utilized in the 20-year JOOdel were created 
to be large enough to incorporate the 30-year plan without redimensioning. 
However, the three retirement proposals under consideration required 
a JOOre xact breakdown of attrited personnel than the 20-year model was 
capable of generating. Due to the need to categorize all attrited officers 
into 5-year groups, the following attrition/retirement categories were 
created for each grade: 
Attrition Category Pertaining to Officers Attriting 
from the Following LOS States 
NC Ul 1 2 3 
5+ 4 5 6 7 8 
10+ 9 10 11 12 13 
15+ 14 15 16 17 18 
20+ 19 20 21 22 23 







The (I-Q) and R matrices for the 30-year model also had to be JOOdifie~ 
to reflect this expansion in the number of states required in JOOdelir.g 
the anticipated system. The matrix computations are identical to those 
for the 20-year irodel. 
DATA 
The date for this irodel was obtained from the Manpower Research and 
Data Analysis Center (MARDAC) here in Monterey. Their files consist of 
virtual card images stored on tapes with approximately 50 data elements 
for each individual on active duty. The files are updated by inputs from 
the Services once per quarter. Data was extracted from these files for 
numbers of attritions, accessions, promotions, non-promotions, and quarterly 
population snapshots for active duty Naval officers for calendar year 1976. 
1976 was chosen because it was the JOOst recent period for which usable 
officer data was available. 
The population snapshots proved to be fairly accurate representations 
of the distribution of Navy officers. An average was taken of the data for 
the four quarters in order to sJOOoth out seasonal variations (which were 
quite significant) and this was used as the benchmark for all subsequent 
modeling. 
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Accession data, however, was very poor. In order to refine it, another 
run was used to compare social security numbers, which were contained in 
the 1976 file, but not present in the previous year ' s file. This procedure, 
although rmre tedious, yie l ded results which were consistent with the 
other data . 
Using the attrition and promotion data as provided by MAROAC, rough 
transitio n probabilities were computed and used along with the accession 
data as initia l inputs to the rrodel. As expected, there were significant 
differences in the steady state population computed by the model using 0 
these probabilities and the actual population data. 
By manipulating prormtion and attrition probabilities sequentially, 
for each grade, the model results were fitted to the actual populati on 
data while preserving the general shape of the distr i bution. Figure 1 
shows the result of this operation far Ensign prormtian data. 
After the present 20-year system was rmdeled, an approach to rmdeling 
a 30-year system had to be decided upon. An expansion of the 20-year 
system was chosen rather than making assumptions about the shape of a 
totally new distribution probabilities. There were two reasons for 
this choice . First, assumptions about the probabilities would have been 
essentially arbitrary and would have effectively predetermined the outcome 
of the model. Secondly, the assumptions would have had to differ for each 
plan and since we had no valid means of quantifying the effect of the 
differences, .(for example, lump sum vs . 1 ifetime payments) the choices 
would again have been arbitrary. 
As a result, a single 30-year distribution was obtained by holding 
the total population of the various grades constant and spreading the 
promotion opportunity over rmre periods. Two procedures were used to 
achieve this. First, the probabilities of promotion in the "zone" were 
decreased and spread over additional years. This could be thought of as 
increasing the number of years an individual was "in the zone" while 
decreasing the selection probability for each, or, alternatively simply 
subdividing the year groups. 
The second procedure was the obvious one of delaying the entire 11zone11 
for one (in the case of Captain) or two (in the case of Commander) years. 
Since the prorootion opportunity was already spread out, this change did 0 
not have to be as drastic as it otherwise would have been. 
Using the techniques descr1bed also allowed extension of the retire-
ment time to 30 years without large changes in the junior ranks, thus 
avoiding the possibly dermralizing effects of being an Ensign for three 




The 30-year distribution also reflects obvious career decision 
points. For instance, a LCDR, upon completion of 19 years of service 
is unlikely to make CDR and is also entitled to some retirement benefits. 
Therefore, there is, as in the 20-year plan, an increased probability of 
attrition (.3 from .011) at that point. 
The resulting officer population seems to be a reasonable basis to 
use in retirement cost comparisons. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the 
population shifts within each grade. 
CONCLUSION 
l • Costing 
Both the 20- and 30- year flow 100dels produced vectors of steady state 
active duty personnel identified by grade and length of service, and 
vectors of the annual attrition flow into (completed length of service -
final grade) states. The active duty costing was performed by multiplying 
the steady-state population in each G-LOS category by the appropriate 
base pay as ·indicated in the present pay tables. The retired costing 
was done on an expected value basis. For each attrited (G - LOS) category, 
the expected lifetime of the individual was determined and the annual 
monetary flow to retired personnel was calculated as the sum over all 
attrited (G - LOS} categories which rate a retirement benefit, each 
category befog computed for the expected number of personnel still alive 
in that category. The total annual cash outflow anticipated for each 
system is shown in Figure 4. 
2. Model Limitations 
The Markovian methodology and the data analysis techniques used to 
reduce the state space implemented by this study, we feel yields a rela-
tively accurate representation of the current Navy officer corps. The 
expansion of this rmdeling effort described previously has been dependent 
upon several important assumptions. The underlying assumption linking 
the modeling of the current officer population to that anticipated with 
the enactment of a 30-year retirement policy is that the services, in order 
to preserve force effectiveness. will desire to maintain relatively the 
same total numbers of individuals within each grade. Secondly. the 100del 
described generates steady-state population information. Fluctuations 
in officer corps complexion are evident as a result of many political a-nd 
military events occurring over the 35-year time span encompassed by the 
population in service. It is for this reason that the quantitative results 
generated are to be interpreted as indicating relative trends or magnitudes 
only. It is highly unlikely that the actual officer corps would ever 
achieve a true steady-state environment. 
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Incorporated into many of the elements of the transition matrices 
are the implicit effects of a 20-year system. The anticipated pol icy 
changes which a 30-year system would bring about have been mechanically 
inserted into the manpower structure as it exists today. Promotion zone 
restructuring and prolll)tion probability changes are the criteria which wil l 
be implemented as part of the 30-year system. The difficu l ty encountered 
is in the heuristic approach utilized to generate feasible accession 
(recruitment) quantities and retention/attrition probabilities for each 
of the froposed alternatives. The decision as to whether an individual 
will co lect a lump sum or will remain in service in order to collect a O 
yearly annuity is one which at this point is extremely difficult to put 
into quantitative terms. 
The study has developed a methodological approach which can be imple-
mented to determine the effects of instituting drastic structural changes 
into the manpower system, f .e. the implementing of a revised retirement 
policy. The ability of the Markov Chain to model the existing manpower 
structures and the fl exib111ty of this type lll)del to incorporate hypo-
thetical structural changes hopefully has been deronstrated. Further 
analysis, especially in the projection of valid attrition/retention data, 
would be required prior to use of the 111>del in the formulation of future 
manpower budget figures or recruitment requirements. 
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Figure 1 : Promotion Probability as a Function of 
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Figure 2: 20 and 30 Year Steady-State Distribution for 
the Rank cf Ensign, Lieutenant J.G. and 
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the Rank of Lieutenant Commander, Corrimanrler and Cartain. 
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CURRENT 20·YEAR PROPOSED 30 YEAR ETIREMENT SYSTEM 
RETIREMENT SYS. 
I II III 
ACDU: $984,191,256 1,002,444,468 1,002,444,468 1 ,002 ,444 ,468 
' . 
RET: $731,424,474 518,941,820 293,580,576 520,366,618 
TOTAL: $1,715,615,730 1 , 521 , 386,288 1,296,025,035 1,522,811,086 
SAVINGS OVER 11 .3% 24.5% 11 .2% 0 
20 YEAR SYS. 
· 30 YEAR ETIREMENT 
ALTERNATIVES SUMMARY 
I 10+ AT 62: 21 .25% 
15+ AT 62: 35.00% 
20+ AT 60: 48.75% 
25+ 
+ 
AT 60: 62.50% 
30+ AT RET: 76 .25+2. 75/YEAR ... 
' ' II 10+ LUMPSUM 1 xBP 
15+ II l.SxBP 
20+ ll 2.SxBP 
25+ II 4.0xBP 
30+ AT RET: 75% 
III ·10+ LUMPSUM l.OxBP 
15+ II 1.SxBP 
20+ AT 30th 50% 
25+ II 62.5% 
30+ AT RET: 75% 
0 




THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF 
COMPUTER PROGRAMMING 
by 
David A. Tussey 
A major problem with the computer age is getting the computer to tell 
us what we know is the right answer. 
The author takes a humorous look at this problem through the eyes of 
the computer programmer. The progranwner's unique personality is ex-
plained ·and any resemblance to known persons, living or dead is purely 
coincidental. His analysis of team structures, incentives and group-
oriented notivation techniques has applicability to any management 
discipline. 
Jhis paper was submitted to Professor E. V. Alden in partial fulfillment 
Qf course requirements for Individual and Group Behavior (MN 2106). 
The Editors 
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Lieutenant David A. Tussey, USN, received a B.E. from Vanderbuilt 
University in Systems and Information Science in 1972. He is presently 




Computer progra11111ing s, by all measures, a human activity, a complex 
pattern of behavior. Yet perhaps because of the emphasis placed on the 
machine aspects of computer progranming, the human behavior aspect has 
been generally ignored. Indeed it has roost often been treated with a 
certain mystique - a waving of the hands, a profession riddled with myths 
and legends. Either you have it or you don1 t. Often it is said that a 
successful computer progra11111er must possess the three S's - 11sel f-
rooti vating, self-evaluating, and strange. 111 It is, of course, the exist-
ence of these myths that frequently blocks effective comnunication and 0 management hroughout a progra11111ing operation . Hopefully, a survey of the 
psychological processes which are functioning within the profession of 
computer progranrning, can enable managers and programmers alike, to 
analyze roore effectively the human aspect of this complex behavior. 
Ultimately, the results of this evaluation of progra11111i ng as human per-
formance, could lead to greater progra11111er success and productivity . 
Perhaps more realistically, we can expect to ponder the question someday, 
"Programming is more than machines, it's also the people who interact 
with these machines. Do I understand the people as well as I understand 
the machines?" 
The programmer, unless he remains a perpetual student, cannot spend 2 his life dazzling an awestruck professor with his programming virtuosity. 
He ultimately will be expected to make the computer provide some useful 
service and will generally be working for an employer. The ability to 
perform useful work is as important a criteria for evaluating a programmer 
as is the mastering of a wealth of technical irifonnation. Evaluating and 
mlding human performance requires an understanding of the behavioral 
components of that human activity. 
What then is the goal of this human performance called progra11111ing? 
Who is a good programner? Many ideas have been advanced as to what are 
the desired qualities of a programmer. Among them: 
1. A good programner writes good programs. 
2. A good progra11111er works well with other people. 
3. A good progranmer co11111unicates with users. 
4. A good progra111J1er works well under pressure. 
1Bodem, W. Ladd, unpublished remarks, November 1972. 





5. A good progranmer likes classical music. 
6. A good programmer takes a bath at least once a week. 
7. A good prograrrrner avoids rowdy parties. 3 
As poor as these categories are, a manager is generally required to somehow 
determine the ability of programmers and influence their performance. What 
does the manager hope to achieve in training and selecting prograrmners? 
Is the super progra1T111er - one who can code faster than a speeding bullet -
looked upon with favor and respect? Generally, no! For the most part, 
the manager is more interested in a person's ability to function as a 
human being in a human organization, and to interface well with other 
users and other prograrrmers. It is to this end that a psychological 
study of computer progranming should prove most fruitful. 
l~hat then are the psychological activities functioning here? ForeJOOst 
on the list of behavioral shaping factors must be the rigid structure and 
environment within which the progranmer works. A programmer must always 
labor under the auspices of that never erring all wise machine. There 
seems to be no difference in the severity of an error in the prograrrming. 
It either works or it doesn't. The limitations of a computer language 
constantly restrain and channel creativity and individual expression. 
The internal operations of the machines, themselves, impose a limitation 
on our problem solving techniques. The programmer encounters an imposed 
structure of methodology by the very nature of its job. He must accept 
and live with these limitations regardless of how contrary they may be to 
his individual thought and behavioral patterns. No doubt, these rigid 
language and methodology constraints severely inhibit creative design and 
thought as well as establish social barriers around those who work within 
these constraints. 
11Progranmers as a group tend to be a somewhat stubborn, unrealistic, 
and uncompromising breed: they often think that their primary function 4 is to invent clever new algorithms, rather than to perform useful work." ,, 
What exactly are the value systems that we encounter in the prograrrming 
field? Nowhere else do the goals appear to be more esoterically defined 
and nowhere else do managers fail so frequently to intervene in the goal 
setting of the individual. Personal fascination and experience carry a 
heavy weight in how one programs. Progranmers seem to have a universal 
feeling that their programs are owned by them and are an extention of 
themselves. It is an area in which it is easy to miss the forest for the 
trees. The progranmer who spends days trying to improve the efficiency 
of a program, when computer time is abundant; and the person who, after 
two months, exclaims that he has finally devised a routine to use the 
XYZ instruction; exist in abundance in the progranming field. The lack of 
3vourdon, p. 4. 
4vourdon, p. 2. 
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experienced personnel and the rapid growth of the field, not only account 
for high salaries, but provide ample fuel for the Peter Principle. Such 
"bumped up11 managers tend to retain their esoteric methods and values 
since this is what they were rewarded for, and sel dom gai n the broader 
picture required to manage projects and people. Rarely is a change from 
progranmer to manager accompanied by a change in occupational goals and 
values. 
Programming ability has been a question of much psychological testing. 
The "Strong Vocational Test 11 and the 11Programmer's Aptitude Test" (PAT} 
have enjoyed great popularity aioong employers. But, their ability to 
define the interest areas or abilities required 5o be a successful pro-granmer has for the most part been unsuccessful. Above average intelli-
gence certainly appears to be a widespread personal it y trait among pro-
grammers, as does arithmetic ability. But there is little correlation 
between solving higher math problems and writing a computer program. 
Certain aspects of programming tend to utilize different facets of mental 
skills. Certainly, some people perform various tasks of problem solvi ng 
better than others. When a system is being designed, creativity and 
imagination are the critical abilities. Then some screening of the ideas 
must occur on the basis of synmetry, structure, and generality of function. 
A progranmer lacking in both creativity or selectivity is surely handicapped. 
When program testing, the critical ability is an eye for the gestalt or 
the wholeness of the project, and the exceptions that exist. Documentation 
requires verbal and graphic ability. The problem solving ability for 
computer progranmers is multifaceted and varies throughout a program's 
lifetime. Certainly, a progranrner must possess an excellent memory. 
Solving complex problems that interact with various other routines requires 
a constant picture of the overall objective . Clearly, the memory has a 
limited capacity and progranmers of large problems experience a saturation 
level . It is not unconmon to find a progralTlller unable to decipher code 
he wrote, himself, a week ago; a problem both of saturation and interference 
learning. This variance of required mental skills perhaps accounts for 
the large personnel base from which programmers emerge. 
Progranmers do not ordinarily work in isolation, indeed, the solo pro-
granmer is under a serious handicap. Progranmers, for the reasons of 
diverse problem solving abilities and l imited mental capacity, tend to be 
much more productive when organized into occupation groups or teams. Often 
it is essential for job completion. These programming groups by necessity 
interact socially as well as mentally and technically. Information is 
exchanged, opinions sought and avoided, and egos built and bruised. A 
progralTllling team may, in fact, solidify as a cohesive unit and obtain great 
strength by combining their strength and establishing a micro-society. The 
team will similarly suffer when the leadership is changed or friction develops 
within the group. The social psychologist has ghed some light on small 
group behavior . Some critical factors include : 
~Weinberg, Gerald M. , The Psychology of Computer Programming, pp. 171-175. 






1. Variations in individual weaknesses and strengths. 
2. Goal fonnation. 
3. Gender and attitudes of the members. 
4. Leadership structure. 
It is the complex interaction of individuals within a group that forms the 
personality of the team, and dictates performance, especially in crisis 
or under stress. 
Regardless of the similarity in the structure of two progranming teams. 
differences invariably result. Differences that are a result of individual 
activity. The solitary programmer, neurotic and obsessed, working alone 
in a room with a teletype. is indeed a widely held archetype. Indeed 
there is no doubt that numerous factors of progranming perfonnance center 
around the individual. The very scope of the term 11progranming11 encom-
passes a vast range of individual talents, needs, age, and experience 
levels. Individual personalities not only influence the way in which 
progran111ers deal with stress. aggression, and humility, but also seem to 
have a way of manifesting themselves in the actual content of the programs. 
Certainly, a programming manager can detect the attitudes of humor, boredom, 
and stress in the programs produced by such a person. Progranmers deal 
with a particularly structured environment, frequently under stressful 
time limits, and occasionally under careless supervision. The individual 
is markedly influenced by this working environment and is certain to reflect 
his personality in his programs, his dealing with his colleagues and his 
value system. Humanists often contend that computersdehumanize people by 
the rigid structure they impose. But perhaps it is because the computer 
is so rigid that the people must supply TJDre than their share of personality 
and flexibility. The humanist might argue that normal relationships share 
equally the give and take, and since here we have a situation where one 
party does all the giving or taking, personality distortions would tend 
to surface. The progranmer is first and foremost an individual with 
individual needs, thoughts and motivations. 
In broad tenns, these areas are all psychological problems facing 
any manager or team leader: the working environment, the individual's 
preceived value system, interaction within the group, and the functioning 
as an individual. The difference is the particular manner in which to 
deal with these psychological functions. How can a progra1T1T1ing manager 
influence these various factors in order to achieve a stable, productive 
progra1T1T1ing e vironment. 
The progranming environment encompasses a variety of factors many of 
which are under a manager's control and all have a psychological impact. 
The physical environments of mst computer centers are deplorable, -
sterile and psychologically counter productive. When will we ever see 
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the end to those horrible half-partitians? They manage to block all 
effective comnunication and let in all irrita t ing and disruptive noise. 
Frank Lloyd Wright said 11fonn follows function " - the ph~sical surround-
ings must be planned to fit the tasks performed in them. The environ-
ment of the programner seems to be sorely ignorant of Wright's ideas 
and the ensuing studies of how physical surroundings affect our work 
habits. 
But what of the inflexible and structured environment of the actual 
computer, computer languages, and operating systems. It seems that the 
major psychological problem is the programmer's awareness of his technical 0 
environment. r-t>re awareness, more knowledge of what options and operations 
are available tends to breed nnre flexibility . This trend towards flexi-
bility is highly desirable if we are to avoid continual frustration and 
scapegoating while trying to program. To some extent, the degree of flexi-
bility, the level of programmer awareness, is a function of fonnal training, 
experience, and the actual programming language or system being utilized. 
Fonnal in-house training sessions, during which the senior programmer 
acts as a teacher concerning difficult aspects of a computer operation, 
are all but nonexistent in most software programning shops. Are such 
sessions too expensive? Too difficult to arrange? Not needed? Many 
organizations, including the military, have long recognized the value of 
in-house education to supplement experience. Whether such sessions are 
held or not, the necessary questions and answers and information exchange 
will take place. Perhaps the exchange could be expedited with a conscious 
effort to disseminate the 11tricks of the trade. " Increased awareness 
of one's options and limits would surely help relieve the pressures of 
anxiety, frustration, and helplessness frequently felt by a programmer. 
A manager can, to some extent, influence the choice of which program-
ming language or system shoul d be utilized , Most progra111Tiers manifest a 
fixation with one particular prograrrming language or techni que and fre-
quently force themselves to work under a severe handicap. It should appear 
obvious t hat given a choice between a very rigid and formal programming 
language and one relatively free of such restrictions, the choke would 
be in favor of freedom of style . But for some programmers such is not the 
case. As noted earlier, experienced and fixation often lead the programmer 
in a complete circle, reinforcing his original fixation with more experience. 
The individual programmer must avoid this pitfall and the manager must try 
for utilization of that programming lan guage or system which allows more 
freedom of expressio n, imagination, and style. Encourage using those 
language features which possess greater strength and flexibility, but are 
seldom learned . The increased creativity and adaptability from choosing 
such a language and uti li zing all its powers seems to histo rically have 
yielded the greatest output with minimal programmer trauma. 




Tryfog to restructure or emphasize certain value systems involves a 
variety of techniques. The most formidable barrier which managers have 
to deal with is the programming ego. Foremost to combating the many 
esoteric actions of a progranmer is to furnish him with a precise defini-
tion of a program's goals. What is really important? Accuracy, speed, 
size, documentation, or adaptability? What program structure is desired? 
Which techniques are to be avoided? To provide meaningful leadership, the 
programming manager must be technically competent. Despite the difficulties 
in judging a good program, they somehow do get judged. Since programmers 
tend to extend themselves into the program, the judgement of the "goodness" 
of a program becomes a judgement on the prograrrrner. The solution to this 
0 ego deflating problem is a restructuring of the social environment, and 
through this means, a restructuring of the value system. 
0 
Al though, not a panacea, the idea of "egol ess programming", 8 or group 
responsibility has shown great success in restructuring the programmer's 
value system as well as his behavior. The egoless progranming design 
depends upon a group of progranmers functioning in a democratic manner in 
order to generate a program from the group. Strong leaders must be 
matched with other strong personalities to prevent dominance and destruc-
tion of the group. The code produced must be the responsibility, not 
of the individual, but of the group. Similarly, the group shares success 
or fail~re. The intent is to encourage free exchange of judgements and 
opinions without damaging the individual's idea of ownership. Indeed we 
should strive for elimination of the idea of owning code. Average people 
can be trained to accept their humanity - their inability to function as 
a machine - and to value it and work with others so as to keep it under 
the kind of control necessary for success. Group evaluation (not to · be 
mistaken for ~roup programming which has proven as uninspiring as an 
all-star game} has deroonstrated greater organization, greater productivity, 
and a much lower probability of 11bugs11 or errors in the finished product. 
The sum is indeed greater than the whole, the key is the individual's 
acceptance of functioning as a team and not only accepting but seeking 
criticism. 
The principle of egoless programming implies that certain management 
techniques be applied to create and maintain this environment. Rewards 
and incentives must be group oriented, as should the competitive spirit. 
Competition among individuals within a group is disruptive to the solid-
ary of the group and can ultimately destroy it. The group must be allowed 
freedom to regulate its own internal structure. Ideally, the leadership 
role should pass from individual to individual as the need for that person's 
particular ~kills arise (designing, debugging, documentation). The role 
of a devil's advocate may have to be formalized, but that technique too 
works better if rotated among the group's members. The life cycle of a 
team starts with recruitment, moves through goal setting and organizing 
8weinberg, pp. 56-60. 
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the tasks, and may end with dissolution when the project is completed. 
fwbst teams tend to manifest two types of leaders - a task-specialist, 
who allocates the work, and a maintenance-specialist who irons out 
interpersonal conflicts. The maintenance-specialists seem to be the 
hardest to come by, but frequently are the key to smooth group operation. 
It is interesting tQ note that this role is frequently filled by a female -
the "team-mother. 119 
Replacement of a leader or member represents a cr1s1s. The democrat-
ically organized tea m tends to be better abl e to withstand such a shock, 
but generally"less able to accept new members. The second most frequent 
crisis is the recognition that one team member is unable to carry his or 
her fair share of the l oad. In both these crises , loss of strength and 
a weak team member, strong action and leadership is required to endure. 
Frequently, it must come from outside . A similar crisis situation develops 
when two strong team leaders emerge. Proper selection of team members can 
frequently avoid such a problem, but the manager shoul d choose team members 
who mesh well - neither too dominant nor passive. Once the team is func-
tioning a 11hands-off 11 policy with regards to internal structure, is preferred . 
The variety of required mental skills mentioned earlier is also better 
dealt with by a programming team. The proper use of these various skills, 
at various times in a program's life, can frequently be best achieved by 
applying a program development technique called top-down-design. This 
technique is in its simplest fonn, a logical breakdown of the problem, 
starting with the largest problem {e.g. generate the monthly report) to 
the smaller divisions of the problem {e.g. determine averages). The term 
top-down-design is fairly well known to most senior programmers, and its 
use carries with it certain psychological implications. The logical 
breakdown of the problem allows easier distribution of the effort and 
analysis, thus enhancing managerial control over the project. Individual 
strengths can be emphasized and experience levels matched with the level 
of difficulty for a particular "module.11 Top-down-design tends to distri-
bute the success of the project more evenly throughout the project's life-
time, rather than suddenly producing a complete working program at the end. 
The early working versions tend to greatly increase programmer morale and 
sustain it until completion. These advantages of top-down-design are a 
natural fit for the team concept and egoless programming. Although formal 
testing has been limited, the early results of this design concept, in-
dicate a substantial improvement in overall programmer performance. Many 
of the reasons for success have nothing to do with a computer. 
Dealing with the individual programmer requires some basic knowledge 
of the science of human behavior. Several psychological processes seem 
to be more prevalent than others. The programmer seems to experience 
a great deal of cognitive dissonance. One frequently hears a programmer 
exclaim "I've found the error, I'm certain it will run this time." 






Although cognitive dissonance is not something we can avoid, it indeed 
is a rode of behavior that we frequently experience and need to be aware 
of. The previously mentioned individual fixation with a system or technique, 
manifests itself frequently whenever a new system is introduced. The 
rejection of an unfamiliar environment seems to be a universal phenomena, 
something akin to losing an old friend, and frequently a manager must exert 
extra effort if such a new system is to be accepted and utilized. The 
individual obviously functions within a complex formal and informal social 
environment. If a manager, indeed the programmer, is to function effectively 
within this structure, he must, either consciously or unconsciously, possess 
a working knowledge of psychological processes. 
Opening this paper we asked the question of why a psychological study 
of computer progranrning. It should be apparent that programming is more 
than producing code. It is an individual and a group activity that takes 
place within a complex social environment. Programming as a human activity 
deals with various aspects of behavior including problem solving ability, 
motivation, group behavior, and creative thought. The psychological study 
of computer programming is infantile compared to the study of other human 
behaviors, perhaps because of the youth of the industry, more likely due 
to the high cost of employing progranmers as experimental subjects. Although 
the industry has grown rapidly in the past few years, it is perhaps in 
the area of psychological research where improverents in human productivity 
and proper management can most easily be achieved. 
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MANA ·GEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM: 
. FRIEND OR FOE? 
by 
Thomas E. Warren 
Alirost all information-processing in organizations as large as the Navy 
is accomplished with the aid of the computer. As the computer has assumed 
this information-processing role, it has become apparent that the timely 
source of data which it generates can be useful for decision-making 
purposes. Studies in this area have resulted in a relatively new discipline 
called Management Information Systems. Its focus ranges from simple appli-
cations, where relevant financial and accounting data is effectively 
sunmarized and presented, to systems where complex decision problems are 
solved by computer routines. 
The author bases his discussion of the subject on four questions. What 
is the Management Infonnation System (MIS)? Where does the MIS fit in the 
organization? Who does the MIS affect? When will the implementation of 
an MIS benefit the organization? The author provides answers to these 
questions and concludes with an example study which demonstrates the imple-
mentation of an MIS. 
This paper was submitted to Commander J.M. Shiels in partial fulfillment 
of the course requirements for Data Processing Management (CT 4182). 
The Editors 
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Lieutenant Tom War~en, USN, received a B.S. from the U.S. Naval Academy 
in 1973. He is presently a candidate for a M.S. in Computer Science at 
the Naval Postgraduate School. 
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I NTROOUCTI ON
What is a management information system? The definitio ns are as 
numerous as are the persons giving definitions, and the perspectives or 
goals of the user. The definition that allows the best f l exibility to 
fit many different user perspectives is: .. An MIS must collect and make 
available such information as is needed by management o run the business. 111 
The system can have as its purpose to provide information to top manage-
ment for planning or decision-making, it could furnish infonnation to the 
functional divisions of a company, such as finance, manufacturing, 
marketing, etc., for the operation of the business, or it coul d be used 
to supply information to operational management at lower levels for the 
purposes of daily control. Furthermore, the system could ~ave the all-
encompassing purpose of satisfying all these requirements. 
The Management Information System is a total information system 
intended to be all-encompassing incorporating the total flow of information 
within the organization. It includes previously automated subsystems 
(payroll, personnel, records, etc.), many other subsystems, and their 
communication links. Although each of these subsystems satisfies an 
information need, the term MIS will be reserved for the total system 
only. 3 · 
Often an individual is described in terms of his characteristics and 
aspirations because an exact description is impossible. The complicated 
and complex MIS is often described in the same way to shed light on the 
nature of its character. 
An effective management information system has the following 
objectives: 
1, To assist the decision-making process in an organization by pro-
viding all levels of management with accurate, timely, and selective 
information that assists the executive or manager in determining a 
specific course of action. 
0 
2. To provide for the objective performance measurement of all rele-
vant elements of the enterprise as they contribute to the total company 
position in the organization from a profit-results viewpoint. 0 
3. To facilitate the economic and efficient production of operating 
and accounting reports required by func..tional managers and of by-product 
information for higher-level management planning and control purposes. 
1Krauss, Leonard I., Computer-Based Management Information Systems, p. 3. 





4. To provide the means of converting the formal written statements 
of executive duties and responsibilities into meaningfu4 action, thereby 
giving direction and force to the overall organization. 
An effective MIS has the following characteristics to support the 
attainment of its objectives: 
1. It is selective and relevant in nature with emphasis on the 
specific problem under consideration by the decision-maker. 
2. It is integrated in such a manner that the functional elements 
of a business and the various levels of management are considered in rela-
tion to each other. Therefore the impact of decisions made for one element 
can be measured and interpreted in terms of its effects on the enterprise 
as a whole. 
3. It represents a synthesis of the information needs of each manager, 
based on his organizational position, responsibilities, and decision-making 
authority in the enterprise. 
4. It must differentiate between the kind of information required 
for management planning and management control purposes in terms of time 
and organization. Information required for planning purposes and the 
formulation of policies cover relatively long periods of time, as opposed 
to control reports, which are for short periods of time. Planning informa-
tion emphasizes future or anticipated programs, whereas control information 
is primarily concerned with the i11111ediate past and current performance. 
The planning function crosses the lines of an organization, whereas control 
reports normally follow lines of organization. 
5. It must be responsive to changes caused by shifts in the organi-
zational structure of the enterprise or changes in the economic or com-
petitive environment in which the enterprise operateg. This responsive-
ness requires flexibility in the information system. 
Now that the concept of an MIS has been defined and described, where 
does the MIS fit into the organization? 
The Management Information System should be the center of the nervous 
system of the enterprise. As such, it should not be oriented to any 
functional area. To achieve the total potential of the data processing 
system, the management and direction of the MIS is a corporate rather than 
a department function.6 
4Krauss, pp. 21-22. 
5Krauss, pp. 23-24. 
6Martino, R. L., Information Management: The Dynamics of MIS, pp. 117-118. 
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t-bst companies have a difficult time recognizing where the MIS fits 
into the current structure . The answer is that it does not fit. Reorgani-
zation i s a must. The procedures and the organizational structures must 
be adjusted to achieve the full benefits of the MIS. 
A Director of Management Information should be established. He heads 
a new division and reports to a company senior executive who is interested 
in overall company efficiency. The MIS department is then free from 
political interchange that often occurs between the regular departments 
and divisions of any company. 0 
This approach is best when the fundamental nature of the organizational 
structure is considered. The purpose of the corporate structure is to 
facilitate the operation of the company toward making a profit. 
The decisions to implement an MIS and reorganize the company to 
accommodate the needs of management must include consideration of the 
company's IOOSt valuable asset: people. Whom does the new system affect? 
Because computerized systems are often new to many people and affect 
such a wide range of company operations, there is resistance to any 
major change within an organization. Introduction of such a system can 
require changing decision-making practices, learning new techniques. and 
establishing new working relationships. All of these are time-consuming 
and disruptive, and consequently they breed resistance. 
Resistance to computerized systems can affect development and use in 
a variety of ways. At the management level, such resistance may arise from 
fear of loss of authority or control over the operations necessary to per-
forming one's job. Or, it may arise from personal reasons - for example, 
from a fear of being passed by or of failing. 
Resistance at the worker level arises in situations involving computer-
ization of operations performed by workers. The publicity given techno-
logical displacement caused by the introduction of computerized data 
processing systems in many companies reinforces the concern many people 
have about losing their jobs to computers, and so increases their resistance 
to an MIS. 
Even though study after study has shown that overall employment in-
creases after the introduction of computers, each person nonetheless 
faces the problem of whether or not he will be given the opportunity 
to upgrade his skills. 
Therefore, some attention must be given to the way changes are 
announced, and the training and retraining opportunities offered, if 
resistance to a new management information system at the management and 






Resistance should be expected from all fronts. The MIS affects every-
one in the organization and as such, can be frightening to anyone who fails 
to understand his place in the company's reorganization. The change must 
be gradual to overcome some of the human problems encountered in imple-
menting a new management information system. 
We've described the character of an MIS, decided where it fits into 
the organization and addressed the people problems associated with major 
change. Now the logical question must be asked and its answer analized. 
When will the implementation of a Management Information System benefit 
the organization? 
Unfortunately, Murphy's Laws apply to implementation of a Management 
Infonnation System: 
l. Things are 1TCre colf1)lex than they appear to be. As simple mental 
processes are expressed in formal fashion, they tend to become more complex. 
2. Things take longer than expected. Schedulers can affirm that 
almost any project tends to take longer than anticipated. 
3. Things cost more than expected. Over sophistication of systems 
leads to less satisfaction and 1TCre cost . 
4. If something can go wrong, it will. While this la, appears to 
be valid, careful planning can reduce or negate its effect. 
The first phase in the development of the MIS is the definition of the 
management goals of the organization and the manner in which it is now 
meeting its goals. The definition should be broad based. If the definition 
is suitable and can be revalidated by philosophical questions, little time 
will be lost in posing the proper questions. It is widely recognized that 
it is nore difficult to pose the right question than to find the right 
answer to the wrong question. 
Some of the questions might be: 
1. What is this organization and what does it represent? 
2. What are the goals of this organization--are they aimed at profit, 
and if so, over what period of time? 
3. What is the preferred manner in which this organization can 
achieve its goals? 
4. What are the available resources by which this organization 
can reach its goals? 
701 Brien, James J., Management Information Systems, pp. 12-13. 
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5. What are the existing and preferred methods of controlling 
this organization as it pursues its goals? 
6. What are the existing methods of measuring whether or not this 
organization is achieving its goals? 
7. What short-range changes are necessary to meet the new or 
revised goals? 
a. What is the long-range forecast for this organization? 8 
If the definition phase cannot pass the first milestone of policy 
evaluation then there is no real need for t he MIS. Assuming the definition 
phase has a positive finding, a more detailed definition of the proposed 
system must be accomplished. 
A closer look at the existing and proposed systems will permit the 
differences between them to be exposed. Those differences then can be 
identified as to high and low impact items. The attention should then 
turn to detenn1ning whether a company is equipped to undertake the MIS 
development. Three ingredients are necessary: (1) top management 
backing, {2~ rank and file management support, and (3) systems staff 
competence. 
If any of the three factors is judged to be below average, the MIS 
should not b~ attempted. Occasionally, some companies succeed with one 
or the other user management group not fully co1Tmitted. But the MIS 
will never work if both management groups are dragging their feet. 
To answer the question of will an MIS benefit the company, it is 
helpful to consider a case study. The company is of moderate size, under 
$70,000,000 in annual sales. A large portion of its business is done 
through direct-response selling - that is, selling a product or service 
through an advertisement. The company sells magazine subscriptions and 
book club memberships. 
Top management decided to install a new computer to process orders, 
to maintain the file of customer names for billing, and to generate 
planning and control information reports for management. No feasibility 
study or cost analysis was done which compared the existing and the new 
systems. 
The top management had an instinctive commitment o a new computeri zed 
system and saw no need for the prepatory analysis. The systems study began 
when a group from the systems analysis section was appointed to develop 
the MIS proposal. 
801Brien, pp. 13-14. 







The operating managers were asked to cooperate but were not asked to 
participate formally in the direction the project took. No corporate 
executive was appointed to head the study group. During the first year 
of development only a few meetings were attended by anyone from management. 
Therefore, the study group lacked top management guidance, support, 
and participation in the systems development work. As a result of the 
study group's efforts, management came to realize that effective and 
economical use of the computer is impossible until the operational and 
decision making processes within the company and the flow of information 
needed for decision making are studied and defined. 
The second study group included a corporate executive, a manager of 
each operational division, and a portion of the systems analysis section. 
This group was able to develop a broad based definition of the system. 
Progress was monitored by the corporate executive who frequently briefed 
other members of top management. 
The members of the study group from the operational areas tended to 
tailor the system to specific local needs. The corporate executive who 
headed the study group saw the conflict of interests and intervened. 
The project would proceed toward company needs and section needs would 
be secondary. As with most projects, the cost of the new MIS was under-
estimated and the performance was overestimated. The cost savings were 
still sufficient to justify the installation of the new MIS. Other 
benefits resulted from the systems development. 
Because of the considerable amount of coordination and education that 
occurred, a spirit of cooperation developed as operating personnel found 
that their ideas were needed and used. Management objectives and policies 
both for the coming year and for the longer term became clear to the 
managers at all levels. 
A team spirit developed as a result of top management seeing the need 
to co1T111unicate its corporate ideas to arrive at the best possible end 
product. Problems were addressed as to cause and solution. Management 
did not seek to reprimand any individual but rather to prevent the 
problem's recurrence. 
As a result, a well-knit operating and management group emerged from 
the systems development effort. Operating and management personnel had 
a conman purpose. The major problems of the company were known and each 
person knew what was expected of him. Most importantly, they knew why they 
were doing their jobs and how their job fit into the rest of the company's 
operation. 
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These side benefits coul d have been lost if time and attention had 
not been devoted to cultivating them. Management cannot expect everything 
to go smoothly in 'developing a new management information system, but 
they should not use this as an excuse for tolerating unnecessary · 
inefficiency.10 . 
Development of a Management Information System is expensive. 
Typically, if the expenditures are compared annual sales, they amount to 
about one to two percent . The commitment must be complete by all levels 
of management. The process i s a lengthy one. But the benefits far out-
weigh the difficulties for an organization that must compete in a world 
where timely and accurate information means can save money and ensure 
success. 
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